



Enhancing Security Resilience in DevSecOps: A Multi-agent Framework for Vulnerability Remediation and Attack Scenario Analysis

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Research Article

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Open Access

Vietnam J. Art. Intell. 2026, 1(1), 27–42
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.65153/f70gzv39>

Received: 27 May 2026

Accepted: 18 July 2026

Published: 16 September 2026

Editor-in-Chief: Thai The Hung

Scientific Editor-in-Chief: Long Tran-Thanh

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Abstract

In the contemporary landscape of cloud-native and high-velocity software engineering, integrating robust security checkpoints within Continuous Integration and Continuous Deployment (CI/CD) pipelines collectively known as DevSecOps faces severe operational bottlenecks. Traditional Static Application Security Testing (SAST) utilities exhibit exorbitant false-positive rates and focus predominantly on vulnerability identification rather than autonomous remediation. This diagnostic limitation culminates in severe security technical debt and prolonged Mean Time to Repair (MTTR). To overcome this challenge, this paper proposes an advanced multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) framework engineered to automate the end-to-end lifecycle of vulnerability identification, localized software patching, and empirical validation.

The core methodology leverages the compact yet structurally capable Qwen2.5-Coder-1.5B model, structurally optimized via Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) on a curated Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) dataset derived from the CIRCL repository. Accelerated by Groq's high-throughput Language Processing Unit (LPU) infrastructure, the inference engine is tightly coupled with Semgrep SAST tools to establish a continuous, multi-agent self-healing feedback loop comprising Remediation, Verification, and Analysis agents. Experimental evaluations conducted on a highly specialized verification suite of real-world vulnerabilities demonstrate substantial quantitative enhancements. The fine-tuned multi-agent system significantly outperformed the zero-shot baseline model, improving the token-level character-based F-score (chrF metric) from 0.3012 to 0.3275 and drastically elevating the generation of syntactically compilable, secure code blocks.

Most notably, this autonomous orchestration reduced the operational MTTR for High and Critical vulnerabilities from a traditional manual baseline of 48 hours to under 35 minutes, successfully eliminating the regressions typically caused by standalone LLMs. Beyond automated source-code repair, the framework synthesizes predictive attack scenario simulations to facilitate proactive infrastructure hardening (e.g., WAF/IPS rule generation), offering a highly resilient and empirically validated blueprint for securing mission-critical DevSecOps pipelines.

Keywords: DevSecOps, Static Application Security Testing, Multi-Agent Systems, Automated Program Repair, Low-Rank Adaptation, Source Code Self-Healing.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context and the Evolution of DevSecOps

The paradigm shift from rigid, sequential software development models, such as the traditional Waterfall method, to Agile frameworks and Continuous Integration/Continuous Deployment (CI/CD) pipelines within DevOps has fundamentally reshaped the velocity of product delivery [13]. Modern software engineering demands that features be designed, implemented, tested, and deployed to production environments within hours or days rather than months [14]. However, this extreme optimization for delivery velocity often shifts security considerations to the final stages of the software development lifecycle (SDLC), or worse, allows structural flaws to escape directly into live production environments [11, 18].

Recognizing this critical exposure gap, the DevSecOps philosophy emerged with the core objective of seamlessly embedding information security practices into every phase of the DevOps lifecycle, establishing a shared-responsibility model among Development, Security, and Operations teams [3, 13]. This transition is frequently characterized by the "Shift-Left" security paradigm, which advocates for integrating security checks as early as the planning and coding stages [18]. By identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities at the source code level, organizations can significantly reduce the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) and prevent costly

post-deployment security breaches.

1.2 Problem Statement and Bottlenecks in Traditional Tools

A core pillar of DevSecOps is the "Shift-Left Security" paradigm. This principle asserts that integrating security testing, linting, and vulnerability identification earlier in the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) significantly reduces both operational friction and the financial costs required for remediation [18]. Extensive industry surveys confirm that repairing a security vulnerability discovered in a production environment is exponentially more expensive than addressing it during the initial code compilation or pull-request integration phases. To operationalize Shift-Left security, modern engineering teams deploy automated testing suites directly into their Continuous Integration (CI) workflows, including Static Application Security Testing (SAST), Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST), and Software Composition Analysis (SCA) [6, 15].

Among these security testing modalities, SAST engines (such as Semgrep, SonarQube, or Checkmarx) serve as the frontline defense [6]. They analyze source code structures and abstract syntax trees (AST) directly without requiring program execution, allowing the early identification of common weakness configurations, including injection attacks, buffer overflows, or weak access control policies [6, 15]. Despite these architectural advantages, the practical adoption of traditional SAST utilities in enterprise environments

encounters severe systemic bottlenecks:

- **Exorbitant False Positive Rates and Semantic Limitations:** Empirical studies demonstrate that alerts generated by standard SAST utilities frequently exhibit false-positive rates (FPR) ranging from 60% to over 90% in large-scale industrial projects. This exorbitant FPR is an inherent consequence of the diagnostic design of SAST: to guarantee soundness and avoid missing real threats (false negatives), static analyzers heavily over-approximate program behaviors. Consequently, they struggle with complex, dynamic language features such as pointer aliasing, polymorphism, and multi-file business logic flows, reporting warnings along execution paths that are practically infeasible during runtime [2, 29]. This phenomenon results in severe "alert fatigue" among development teams, causing engineers to lose confidence in automated security findings and ultimately slowing down deployment velocity as valid alerts are buried in noise [29, 30].
- **The Disconnection Between Detection and Remediation:** Traditional SAST tools operate strictly as diagnostic and reporting mechanisms. They pinpoint potential code flaws but leave the entire burden of remediation to human engineers. Resolving these issues remains a highly manual, labor-intensive process. Industrial surveys indicate that developers spend an average of 10 to 20 minutes manually inspecting a single static bug alarm to determine its validity, with many complex alarms requiring multiple rounds of expert review [2, 29]. This manual intervention serves as a major operational bottleneck. When engineers are forced to pause feature implementation to analyze deep semantic structures, research mitigation strategies, write security patches, and re-test code blocks, the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) is drastically prolonged. Over time, this disconnection accelerates the accumulation of security technical debt, rendering traditional SAST inadequate for the high-velocity demands of modern DevSecOps pipelines [29].

1.3 The Emergence of Code Large Language Models

The Promise of LLM-Driven Repair The rapid advancement of specialized Large Language Models for code (Code LLMs), such as the open-source Qwen2.5-Coder-1.5B suite and DeepSeek-Coder models, introduces a novel paradigm to address the aforementioned DevSecOps bottlenecks [2]. By framing source-code vulnerability remediation as a sequence-to-sequence neural machine translation (NMT) task, these deep learning architectures have demonstrated strong capabilities in semantic comprehension and synthesizing complex code modifications [7]. Unlike traditional rule-based or heuristic Automated Program Repair (APR) methods that rely on predefined mutation templates, Code LLMs can generalize across multiple programming languages and adapt to highly contextual business logic.

The "Overfitting" Problem and Security Degradation However, deploying a standalone, single-turn LLM directly into a production CI/CD pipeline for automated vulnerability remediation poses severe operational and security risks. The core issue lies in the non-deterministic nature of generative AI. Recent empirical studies on AI-assisted

software development highlight an alarming paradox: developers and automated systems utilizing unguided LLMs can inadvertently degrade software security. Research indicates that between 19% and 50% of AI-generated code snippets contain inherent security flaws [3]. Furthermore, while AI-generated code tends to be structurally less complex, it exhibits a significantly higher prevalence of specific vulnerabilities, such as CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) and CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials), compared to human-written code [4].

In the APR literature, this phenomenon is widely recognized as the overfitting problem. An unguided LLM frequently generates "plausible" patches code modifications that successfully compile and resolve the immediate syntactic warning but are semantically incorrect or overfitted to the specific context, ultimately failing to capture the true intended behavior of the program [17]. In a security context, this means the LLM might resolve the original SAST alert (e.g., bypassing a warning by simply removing an unused variable) while silently introducing a secondary, far more critical vulnerability [4].

The Need for Bounded Verification and Neuro-Symbolic Approaches The root cause of these risks is that standard single-turn LLMs completely lack internal, formal verification mechanisms. When an LLM proposes a code fix, it operates purely on a probabilistic projection of language structures (predicting the next most likely token) without any inherent mathematical guarantees of compilation correctness or security rule compliance. If an AI agent produces an invalid or syntactically flawed fix, the code breaks down during the pipeline's automated build or integration phase. This failure forces human engineers to manually intervene, clean up corrupted code blocks, and restart the pipeline, thereby drastically increasing operational friction and defeating the core purpose of automated DevSecOps.

Consequently, to safely harness the generative power of LLMs within high-stakes enterprise environments, the industry is shifting toward neuro-symbolic and multi-agent architectures. These advanced frameworks integrate the neural reasoning capabilities of LLMs with the formal, deterministic guarantees of symbolic logic (such as static analysis, SMT solving, and dynamic sandboxing) [28]. By enforcing a strict "closed-loop" verification mechanism where the LLM's output is continuously challenged and validated by external security engines before integration, organizations can mitigate AI hallucination and achieve highly reliable, self-healing code remediation.

1.4 Proposed Solution and Framework Contributions

Bridging the Gap with Neuro-Symbolic Orchestration To overcome the aforementioned limitations of traditional SAST and standalone generative models, this study proposes a neuro-symbolic multi-agent framework capable of automating the closed-loop cycle of vulnerability detection, reasoned remediation, rigorous verification, and empirical correctness analysis. Inheriting multi-agent architecture concepts from Mukherjee [10] and state-of-the-art automated testing standards [17], we decompose the complex cognitive workflow of software security patching into discrete, bounded tasks. Rather than relying on an isolated, all-powerful generative instance which is prone to hallucination and semantic drift, our framework orchestrates

specialized autonomous agents that continuously interact via a tight, closed-loop feedback mechanism, acting as strict gatekeepers for one another's outputs.

Core Scientific Contributions. The core scientific and engineering contributions of this research are multifold and can be summarized as follows:

1. **Standardized Preprocessing Pipeline for Security Data:** We construct and standardize an automated data preprocessing pipeline based on the raw CIRCL vulnerability-cwe-patch dataset. This pipeline successfully curates 7,524 high-quality, instruction-tuned conversational samples covering the top 30 most frequent programming languages, operating under the advanced classification guidance of the GPT-OSS-20B model.
2. **Autonomous Multi-Agent Orchestration:** We design and implement a novel multi-agent ecosystem comprising specialized roles: the Remediation Agent (for code synthesis), the Verification Agent (for isolated compilation and security rule validation), and the Analysis Agent (for threat reachability and reporting). This architecture optimizes autonomous interaction within the DevSecOps pipeline, shifting the paradigm from passive alert generation to active, self-healing code repair.
3. **Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) on Compact LLMs:** We successfully fine-tune the compact yet highly capable Qwen2.5-Coder-1.5B-Instruct model using Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA). By optimizing this architecture, we demonstrate its capability to achieve remediation accuracy and syntactic compliance comparable to or exceeding substantially larger, resource-heavy models, specifically for High and Critical severity Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs).
4. **Mathematical Self-Healing Loop via Symbolic Feedback:** We propose a conditional probability-driven autonomous self-healing algorithm tightly coupled with the Semgrep static analysis engine. By utilizing dynamic SAST signals as deterministic feedback loops, the framework effectively resolves the "overfitting problem" in automated repair, reducing the operational Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) from several days to under 30 minutes.
5. **Empirical Correctness and "Zero-Trust" Benchmark Validation:** We provide a rigorous empirical evaluation of patch correctness, safety, and syntactic validity across diverse software security scenarios. By explicitly distinguishing between merely plausible patches (which bypass compilation) and correct patches (which resolve the underlying semantic flaw without regressions), this study establishes a clear, empirically validated path toward zero-trust automated software engineering.

Paper Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:

- Section 2 (Related Work): Reviews the existing literature concerning DevSecOps integration challenges, the

systemic bottlenecks of SAST methodologies, and the evolution of LLM-driven Automated Program Repair.

- Section 3 (Methodology & Architecture): Details the theoretical foundations of our proposed framework, tracing the dataset preprocessing mechanics, the multi-agent orchestration design, the mathematical layout of our LoRA fine-tuning approach, and the step-by-step logic of the self-healing algorithm.
- Section 4 (Experimental Results): Delivers our quantitative and empirical findings, featuring an intensive evaluation of code synthesis capacity, a targeted look at remediation rates across different severity tiers, and a comprehensive breakdown of failure modes.
- Section 5 (Conclusion & Future Work): Summarizes the operational impact of our findings, discusses the limitations encountered, and delineates strategic vectors for future engineering work in AI-assisted cybersecurity.

2. RELATED WORK

The integration of security into the high-velocity software development lifecycle has evolved from an isolated testing phase into a continuous, automated paradigm. To provide a comprehensive contextual foundation for our proposed multi-agent framework, this section critically reviews the existing literature across four interconnected domains: the evolution of DevSecOps, the systemic bottlenecks of Static Application Security Testing (SAST), the application of Large Language Models (LLMs) in Automated Program Repair (APR), and the emergence of neuro-symbolic multi-agent orchestration.

2.1 Security Integration in DevSecOps and CI/CD Pipelines

The paradigm shift from traditional software development to DevOps has significantly accelerated deployment velocity, but it historically sidelined security considerations, treating them as a post-development afterthought. To bridge this critical exposure gap, the DevSecOps philosophy emerged, advocating for "Shift-Left Security" to embed automated security controls seamlessly into Continuous Integration and Continuous Deployment (CI/CD) pipelines [11, 27]. Abiona et al. emphasize that traditional separate security phases lead to vulnerabilities being overlooked until late in the process, resulting in costly and time-consuming breaches [13].

To operationalize this, various frameworks have been proposed. Kumar and Goyal introduced the ADOC model, which transforms security from ad-hoc compliance activities into continuous assurance-oriented activities by codifying security controls into an automated delivery workflow using open-source software over the cloud [12]. Similarly, research has highlighted the necessity of Security-as-Code and automated testing to mitigate risks associated with containerized environments and microservices [20, 27]. However, while the theoretical foundation of DevSecOps is well-established, practitioners continuously face operational friction. A systematic review by Saleh et al. identified that despite the availability of automated tools, securing CI/CD pipelines is hindered by configuration complexities, unverified third-party dependencies, and the lack of standardized practices for integrating these tools seamlessly [1]. Our pro-

posed framework builds upon these integration principles but extends them by moving beyond passive orchestration toward active, autonomous risk mitigation.

2.2 The Systemic Bottlenecks of Static Application Security Testing (SAST)

DevSecOps pipelines, Static Application Security Testing (SAST) serves as the frontline diagnostic mechanism. However, the literature extensively documents its severe operational bottlenecks, most notably its exorbitant false-positive rates. Dalaq et al. conducted a systematic literature review revealing that while SAST tools (such as SonarQube and Checkmarx) are highly effective on synthetic benchmarks like the OWASP Benchmark or Juliet Test Suite, their detection rate drops precipitously when applied to real-world software, with empirical studies showing that only 12.7% of real-world vulnerabilities are accurately detected by standard tools [30].

The root cause of this inefficiency lies in the architectural design of static analyzers. To guarantee soundness and avoid missing real threats (false negatives), SAST engines rely on over-approximation, evaluating control-flow and data-flow paths that are practically infeasible during runtime. An extensive industrial study conducted at Tencent by Du et al. demonstrated that SAST tools can exhibit false alarm rates exceeding 95% in large-scale enterprise systems, particularly for complex flaws like Null Pointer Dereferences. This phenomenon causes severe "alert fatigue" among development teams. Resolving these alerts remains a highly manual process, with industrial professionals spending an average of 10 to 20 minutes manually inspecting a single static bug alarm. Consequently, traditional SAST tools act strictly as diagnostic reporting mechanisms, leaving the entire burden of code remediation to human engineers [30]. Our framework directly tackles this bottleneck by utilizing SAST signals (via Semgrep) not merely as end-state alerts, but as dynamic feedback mechanisms to guide autonomous LLM-driven repair.

2.3 LLMs in Automated Program Repair (APR) and The Overfitting Problem

To address the manual remediation bottleneck, recent advancements have focused on Automated Program Repair (APR) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs). By framing vulnerability repair as a sequence-to-sequence neural machine translation task, LLMs have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in semantic comprehension and patch synthesis [2, 28]. Antal et al. demonstrated that models like GPT-4o, when provided with appropriate contextual information such as Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) metadata, can successfully repair a significant portion of Java vulnerabilities in zero-shot settings [21].

Despite this promise, deploying standalone generative AI into production pipelines introduces critical risks. A persistent challenge in APR is the overfitting problem, wherein an automated system generates a "plausible" patch that passes all syntactic checks and test cases but fails to correct the underlying semantic flaw, or worse, breaks intended functionalities [17]. Furthermore, empirical analyses indicate that AI-generated code, while structurally simpler, exhibits a higher prevalence of specific vulnerabilities (such as CWE-78 OS Command Injection and CWE-798 Hard-coded Cre-

dentials) compared to human-written code [4]. Standalone LLMs operate on probabilistic token prediction and lack formal mathematical guarantees of correctness [28]. As demonstrated by Bakhshandeh et al., utilizing LLMs directly on source code without deterministic guidance often yields worse results than traditional SAST tools [2]. Therefore, while ideas from LLM-based APR are highly applicable for generating candidate patches, they cannot be deployed safely without a rigid verification environment.

2.4 Multi-Agent Systems and Neuro-Symbolic Orchestration

To safely harness the generative capabilities of LLMs while mitigating their non-deterministic nature, the research community is shifting toward Neuro-Symbolic Program Repair (NSPR) and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). NSPR defines systems that combine neural components (LLMs) with symbolic components (static analysis, SMT solving, and deterministic compilers) to achieve a balance of coverage, correctness, and interpretability. Anwar's systematic review confirms that NSPR systems report higher correct repair rates and significantly lower hallucination rates compared to purely neural approaches [28].

Concurrently, the concept of the "Web of Agents" and MAS has evolved from early theoretical models (like the FIPA standards) into practical, LLM-powered collaborative frameworks. In a MAS, the cognitive load is distributed among multiple autonomous entities that interact to solve complex problems [24, 25]. Mukherjee proposed an architectural concept for a multi-agent security framework consisting of specialized agents (Threat Modeling, Secure Code Generation, Security Testing) to enforce continuous security gates [3]. Modern agentic AI frameworks such as MetaGPT and CrewAI have proven that role-specialized agents communicating via structured protocols can handle complex software engineering tasks more effectively than single-agent loops [24].

Our proposed multi-agent framework synthesizes these state-of-the-art concepts. By implementing a neuro-symbolic architecture, we utilize the generative power of a LoRA-optimized LLM (the Remediation Agent) strictly bounded by the symbolic, deterministic validation of SAST engines and microVM compilation (the Verification Agent). This closed-loop multi-agent orchestration directly addresses the overfitting problem identified in traditional APR [17] and the false-positive fatigue of SAST [29], providing a novel, empirically validated pipeline for zero-trust automated remediation.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Standardized Preprocessing Pipeline for Security Data

The foundation enabling the proposed multi-agent framework to learn robust security remediation behaviors is transduced from the large-scale, open-source CIRCL vulnerability-cwe-patch repository. This repository stores diverse, real-world vulnerability records paired with their corresponding code modifications (commits and patches). However, raw historical vulnerability data inherently exhibits high noise levels, missing attributes, and a lack of the standardized instructional structures required for supervised fine-tuning. Previous empirical studies emphasize that data inconsistencies and extreme class imbalances in vulnerabil-

ity datasets severely degrade the predictive performance of Deep Learning models, making rigorous data normalization an absolute prerequisite [17].

To overcome these data quality barriers and optimize the training of the autoregressive transformer layers, we established a rigorous, seven-stage automated preprocessing pipeline:

1. **Feature Reduction and Metadata Pruning:** Raw version control records contain vast amounts of tangential metadata. All fields irrelevant to core code semantics—such as author names, repository hashes, timestamps, and branch commit IDs—are systematically discarded. The system isolates and retains only two primary fields: the vulnerable code block paired with its precise Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifier, and the corresponding corrected patched code block. This aggressive pruning prevents the model from overfitting to version control noise and forces the attention mechanism to focus entirely on the causal security relationships.
2. **Deep Data Cleaning and AST Validation:** As highlighted by recent industrial studies on automated bug detection, feeding models with incomplete or ambiguous code contexts inevitably leads to hallucinated repairs. To ensure data integrity, automated filters are implemented to purge incomplete records, rows with missing values, empty code blocks, or severe syntax anomalies. Ensuring syntactic completeness is critical, as fragmented code would disrupt downstream Static Application Security Testing (SAST) and Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) parsing operations during the Verification Agent's validation phase.
3. **Automated Language Annotation via Zero-Shot Classification:** A significant portion of the raw repository lacks explicit programming language attributes. To prevent cross-language tokenization conflicts, this study utilizes the advanced GPT-OSS-20B model as a zero-shot classifier. The classifier analyzes the syntactic markers and keywords of each raw vulnerable code snippet to append accurate language metadata tags (e.g., Python, C++, Java, Go, Rust). This guarantees proper structural routing and language-specific syntax awareness during the tokenization phase.
4. **Filtering and Distribution Balancing:** Real-world vulnerability repositories are heavily skewed toward a few dominant programming languages (e.g., C/C++ or JavaScript). To prevent the model from overfitting to this majority class and subsequently losing its generalization capabilities across wider DevSecOps environments, we rank the language frequency distributions. The pipeline retains only samples belonging to the top 30 most frequent programming languages and applies strategic down-sampling techniques to the heavily skewed language subgroups, ensuring a balanced, multi-language training distribution.
5. **Semantic Noise Reduction (Anti-Aliasing):** Developers frequently include cosmetic modifications alongside security fixes in a single commit. The pipeline rigorously screens and eliminates code changes that

purely alter formatting properties (such as whitespaces, indentations, or documentation blocks) without modifying the underlying application logic or security state. This step acts as a semantic anti-aliasing filter, guarding against optimization loss and ensuring that the model calculates gradient updates based solely on actual security logic transformations rather than non-semantic visual features.

6. **Instruction-Tuned Tokenization and Formatting:** The cleaned data is subsequently mapped into the standardized chat template format compatible with the Qwen2.5-Coder tokenizer. The data is structured using a hierarchical conversational layout: System -> User -> Assistant. The System block explicitly defines the rigid role constraints of the Remediation Agent, the User block delivers the vulnerable code context and corresponding SAST alert, and the Assistant block targets the ideal, empirically verified patch code.
7. **Rigorous Dataset Splitting:** To ensure an objective, unbiased evaluation of the model's performance, the processed dataset is randomly partitioned into three mutually exclusive subsets. Specifically, 80% of the data is allocated to the training set to update the LoRA weights, 10% serves as a validation set for continuous cross-evaluation during the training loop to monitor convergence, and the remaining 10% is strictly quarantined as an independent test set for final benchmarking.

Upon completing this comprehensive preprocessing cycle, a high-quality, instruction-tuned dataset containing exactly 7,524 clean conversational samples is achieved. This curated dataset guarantees a deep, noise-free representation of real-world software vulnerability repair patterns across multiple syntax families, laying the optimal foundation for the multi-agent self-healing loop.

3.2 Autonomous Multi-Agent Orchestration Architecture

The proposed framework replaces the sequential, passive nature of traditional DevSecOps pipelines with an intelligent, neuro-symbolic orchestration engine comprising three autonomous agents. Inheriting principles from advanced Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) and modern Agentic AI [24, 25], these specialized entities collaborate via strict internal communication protocols to govern the entire vulnerability remediation lifecycle. As depicted in Figure 1, the architecture transitions vulnerability detection from a diagnostic alert system into an autonomous self-healing and risk analysis ecosystem.

a. The Remediation Agent (The Synthesizer) This agent directly receives vulnerability alerts from the CI/CD pipeline and assumes the responsibility of generating localized code modifications. Powered by the LoRA-fine-tuned Qwen2.5-Coder-1.5B-Instruct model, the Remediation Agent employs an advanced Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting strategy. CoT mimics human cognitive debugging by explicitly instructing the Large Language Model to articulate intermediate reasoning steps before emitting




Figure 1: Dataset after data cleaning process




Figure 2: The proposed framework: Transforming vulnerability detections into autonomous remediation and risk analysis using a multi-agent LLM system

the final code patch. This deterministic reasoning sequence forces the model to systematically analyze:

- The root cause of the vulnerability (e.g., unvalidated user input leading to injection, or buffer bounds overflow) based on its explicit Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) metadata and signatures
- The blast radius of the flaw within the surrounding execution flow, relying on structural representations such as the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) and inter-procedural call graphs.
- The minimal code modifications required to neutralize the vulnerability while strictly preserving the developer's original business logic and system performance.

By enforcing this structured cognitive breakdown, the Remediation Agent significantly suppresses the hallucination rates and semantic drift typically associated with zero-shot

generative AI

b. The Verification Agent (The Gatekeeper) Acting as a strict, symbolic gatekeeper, this agent validates the remediation quality before allowing any AI-generated code to progress through the CI/CD pipeline. Its primary scientific function is to combat the notorious "overfitting problem" prevalent in Automated Program Repair (APR), where generative models produce "plausible" patches that successfully compile but fail to resolve the underlying semantic flaw or inadvertently introduce secondary defects. Deeply integrated with the Semgrep static analysis engine, the Verification Agent executes a rigorous, multi-stage validation sequence upon receiving a patch candidate from the Remediation Agent:

- **Isolation and Sandboxing:** It extracts the proposed patch and writes it to an isolated sandbox environment man-

aged via lightweight microVMs or secure container runtimes, ensuring safe and unbounded execution testing.

- **Syntactic Validation:** It strictly validates syntactic correctness via language-specific compilers and AST parsers to prevent pipeline build failures.
- **Semantic Security Scanning:** It executes comprehensive Semgrep SAST scans utilizing the corresponding security ruleset to ensure the original flaw is neutralized without triggering new alarms.

If the patch passes all symbolic checks exhibiting zero syntax errors and no remaining or newly introduced SAST findings the Verification Agent approves the patch for integration. Conversely, if compilation exceptions or vulnerabilities persist, the agent compiles the explicit error logs (compiler diagnostics or Semgrep output) into a structured technical message (Feedback_SAST) and routes it back to the Remediation Agent. This deterministic feedback initiates an iterative self-healing loop, refining the code until empirical correctness is achieved [6, 29].

c. The Analysis Agent (The Evaluator) The Analysis Agent introduces a proactive validation and threat positioning layer to the framework. Operating in tandem with Groq's high-speed inference infrastructure, this agent dissects the broader security implications of the initial vulnerability. Rather than relying on simple, static severity calculations (which often misrepresent true enterprise risk), it operationalizes the principles of Risk-Based Vulnerability Management (RBVM) [6].

The Analysis Agent models threats across architectural dimensions to determine actual risk reachability and evaluates the potential impact on system Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (the CIA triad) [8]. Furthermore, it maps exploitability factors against established frameworks (such as STRIDE) to establish strict data provenance boundaries [10]. The ultimate output of this agent's analysis is synthesized into a comprehensive Vulnerability Remediation Report delivered to system administrators. This intelligence provides actionable insights and predictive attack scenario simulations (e.g., automated Web Application Firewall rule generation), effectively bridging the gap between code-level repair and infrastructure-level resilience [8].

3.3 Mathematical Formulation of Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning

3.3.1 Objective Function of Supervised Instruction Tuning

In the context of supervised instruction tuning for Automated Program Repair (APR), the vulnerability repair task is framed as an autoregressive generation problem. Let an input token sequence (comprising the system prompt, the vulnerable code context, and the expected patch) be denoted as $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_T)$. The generative model learns to predict the next token based on the conditional probability of prior tokens. The total sequence probability is mathematically formulated as:

$$P(x) = \prod_{t=1}^T P(x_t | x_{<t}; \theta)$$

where $x_{<t}$ denotes the sequence of tokens preceding

position t , and θ represents the model's learnable parameters. The optimization objective employs the standard cross-entropy loss function:

$$L(\theta) = -\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \log P(x_t | x_{<t}; \theta)$$

The ultimate training objective is to find an optimal parameter set θ that minimizes $L(\theta)$, thereby maximizing the likelihood of generating secure code patches that strictly match the gold-standard expert implementations in the training data.

3.3.2 Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) Mechanics

Directly updating the massive pre-trained weight matrices $W \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times k}$ (where d and k denote the layer dimensions), of an LLM during fine-tuning is computationally prohibitive and prone to catastrophic forgetting. Instead, Low-Rank Adaptation LoRA freezes the original weights W and models the weight update ΔW via a low-rank decomposition into two matrices $A \in \mathbb{R}^{r \times k}$ and $B \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times r}$, where the rank $r \ll \min(d, k)$. The updated weight matrix during the forward pass is defined as:

$$W^t = W + \Delta W = W + \frac{\alpha}{r} (B \cdot A)$$

where:

- Matrix A is initialized using a random Gaussian distribution $N(0, \sigma^2)$
- Matrix B is strictly initialized to zero, ensuring that $\Delta W = 0$ at the onset of training, which preserves the foundational reasoning capabilities of the base model intact.
- r is the rank parameter, fixed at $r = 16$ across our experiments to balance capacity and efficiency.
- α is a constant scaling factor that dictates the magnitude of the adapter's contribution to the core weights, set to $\alpha = 32$

With this configuration, the scaling factor multiplier is $\alpha/r = 2$. This implies that the weight gradients learned by the LoRA matrices are mathematically amplified by a factor of 2 before being injected into the forward pass calculation, significantly accelerating loss convergence under domain-specific data constraints.

3.3.3 Target Module Mapping Strategy

To ensure the Remediation Agent masters both deep context comprehension and flexible syntax restructuring, LoRA adapters are densely applied across all critical linear layers of the Transformer architecture within the Qwen2.5-Coder-1.5B-Instruct model. Specifically:

- Attention operators: q_proj (Query), k_proj (Key), v_proj (Value), and o_proj (Output Projection). Intervening within the multi-head self-attention mechanisms enhances the model's capacity to establish long-range contextual dependencies between textual CWE rule descriptions and localized vulnerable code regions.
- Feed-Forward Network (FFN) operators: $gate_proj$, up_proj , and $down_proj$. Integrating adapters within

the dense FFN layers helps adjust semantic token transformations, optimizing the model's ability to generate valid structural modifications across diverse programming syntaxes without hallucination.

3.4 Empirical Training Pipeline Setup

To securely execute the aforementioned mathematical formulation, the empirical training pipeline was rigorously configured for stable gradient descent on hardware-constrained environments. The hyperparameter specifications were established as follows:

- **Epochs:** The entire preprocessed dataset is processed through exactly 3 complete training epochs. This bound ensures sufficient pattern learning and loss convergence while strictly preventing the model from memorizing the training data, thereby mitigating the overfitting problem commonly observed in generative APR.
- **Batch Size and Gradient Accumulation:** To minimize the GPU VRAM footprint during the forward pass, the per-device batch size is set to 1. To maintain a robust and stable gradient descent trajectory, gradient accumulation is leveraged with 4 steps. Thus, the mathematically effective batch size per weight update is computed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Effective Batch Size} &= \text{Per-device Batch Size} \\ &\quad \times \text{Gradient Accumulation Steps} \\ &= 1 \times 4 = 4 \end{aligned}$$

- **Learning Rate and Regularization:** The peak learning rate is set to a constant 2×10^{-4} combined with a weight decay factor of 0.01. This regularization penalizes extreme weight magnitudes and prevents gradient explosions. Furthermore, a linear warmup scheduler is applied during the initial steps to gradually stabilize the momentum of the optimizer.
- **Mixed Precision Training:** The training loop is executed using the 16-bit floating-point format (FP16 Mixed Precision). This architecture enables both forward and backward passes to compute at a lower precision, drastically accelerating Tensor Core throughput and cutting VRAM consumption by nearly 50%. Simultaneously, the primary master weights are preserved in FP32 precision to guarantee mathematical stability and prevent numerical underflow during micro-gradient updates.
- **Logging and Checkpoints:** System telemetry logging is performed every 10 steps, and model checkpoints (the LoRA adapter weights) are automatically serialized every 300 steps to mitigate the risks of hardware interruption and allow for granular post-training evaluation.

3.5 Autonomous Self-Healing Algorithm and Mathematical Optimization

The operational core of the proposed neuro-symbolic multi-agent framework lies in its autonomous self-healing algorithm. Distinct from traditional rule-based Automated Program Repair (APR) systems that rely on rigid abstract syntax tree (AST) mutations or heuristic string replacements [17], this algorithm mathematically frames vulnerability remediation as a dynamic, conditional probability optimization problem.

3.5.1 Probabilistic Patch Estimation

The system treats the LoRA-optimized Large Language Model (the Remediation Agent) as a posterior probability estimator. The objective is to navigate the stochastic space of candidate patches to discover an optimal patch, denoted as M_{patch} , that maximizes the conditional probability given the invariant vulnerable code context C_{vuln} and the dynamic technical verification feedback $Feedback_{SAST}$. This is formally defined as:

$$P_{repair} = \operatorname{argmax} P(M_{patch} | C_{vuln}, Feedback_{SAST})$$

where the state variables are defined as follows:

- C_{vuln} : The original code snippet containing the vulnerability delivered by the CI/CD pipeline. This acts as a strict, invariant contextual anchor across all iterations, mathematically enforcing that the generated patch preserves the adjacent business logic, variable states, and structural integrity of the developer's original implementation.
- $Feedback_{SAST}$: A dynamic conditional variable representing the aggregated symbolic feedback from the Verification Agent. In the initial iteration ($i = 0$), it contains the exact error line, the violated Semgrep rule, and the specific CWE identifier. In subsequent self-healing loops, it is dynamically appended with compiler diagnostic errors or secondary SAST findings, creating an evolving constraint matrix.
- M_{patch} : The set of candidate patch variations generated by the model's potential function f :

$$C_{patch} = f(C_{vuln}, E_{Semgrep}, \theta_{LoRA})$$

where $E_{Semgrep}$ represents the raw text log of the initial SAST finding, and LoRA denotes the optimized low-rank adapter weight space that suppresses conversational hallucinations.

3.5.2 Step-by-Step Algorithmic Execution

- **Step 1: Ingestion and Finding Capture.** When the CI/CD pipeline flags a security flaw during the build stage, the Verification Agent runs an initial SAST scan. It extracts the vulnerable code segment C_{vuln} , identifies the precise line numbers, and maps the issue into the initial constraint set $E_{Semgrep}$. This context is then securely routed to the Remediation Agent.
- **Step 2: Candidate Patch Synthesis.** The Remediation Agent constructs a multi-turn prompt context. Utilizing an advanced Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning strategy, the model is forced to explicitly analyze the data-flow reachability and the vulnerability's root cause before generating a fix. It ultimately outputs a clean, syntactically isolated code block C_{patch} , strictly stripped of natural language conversational filler, and forwards it to the Verification Agent.
- **Step 3: Symbolic Verification and Loop Branching.** The system initializes an iteration counter $i = 1$. The Verification Agent compiles and executes C_{patch} within an




Figure 3: LoRA-based Code Repair Fine-tuning Pipeline

Input: Buggy source code C_{bug} , initial SAST alert R_{sast} , maximum iterations $N_{max} = 3$

Output: Verified secure code C_{fixed} or failure exception

```

1: Initialize iteration counter  $i = 0$ 
2: Context = { $C_{bug}$ ,  $R_{sast}$ }
3:  $C_{current} = C_{bug}$ 
4: WHILE  $i < N_{max}$  DO
5:   // Remediation Agent generates patch
6:    $C_{candidate} = \text{RemediationAgent}.$ 
     GeneratePatch(Context,  $C_{current}$ )
7:
8:   // Verification in isolated microVM
9:   Compile_Status, Syntax_Logs =
     VerificationAgent.Compile( $C_{candidate}$ )
10:
11:   IF Compile_Status == FALSE THEN
12:     // Failure Branch 1: Syntax Error
13:     Context = Context U {Syntax_Logs}
14:      $C_{current} = C_{candidate}$ 
15:      $i = i + 1$ 
16:     CONTINUE
17:   END IF
18:
19:   // SAST validation on compilable code
20:   SAST_Status, Security_Logs =
     VerificationAgent.RunSemgrep( $C_{candidate}$ )
21:
22:   IF SAST_Status == PASSED THEN
23:     // Successful Branch
24:      $C_{fixed} = C_{candidate}$ 
25:     AnalysisAgent.GenerateReport(
        $C_{bug}$ ,  $C_{fixed}$ ,  $i$ )
26:     RETURN  $C_{fixed}$ 
27:   ELSE
28:     // Failure Branch 2: Security flaw persists
29:     Context = Context U {Security_Logs}
30:      $C_{current} = C_{candidate}$ 
31:      $i = i + 1$ 
32:   END IF
33: END WHILE
34: RETURN "Exception: Max iterations reached.
     Manual triage required."
  
```

Algorithm 1. Autonomous Neuro-Symbolic Self-Healing Loop

isolated microVM sandbox. To combat the severe "over-fitting problem" in APR where models generate plausible but semantically incorrect fixes the agent evaluates a strict joint verification function:

$$\text{Verification}(C_{patch}) = \text{Check}_{\text{Syntax}}(C_{patch}) \wedge \text{Check}_{\text{SAST}}(C_{patch})$$

- **Successful Branch:** If the code is syntactically sound ($\text{Check}_{\text{Syntax}}(C_{patch}) = \text{True}$) and Semgrep confirms the vulnerability is entirely eradicated without introducing secondary findings ($\text{Check}_{\text{SAST}}(C_{patch}) = \text{True}$), the function returns *True*. The system terminates the loop and approves the patch for merge into the primary repository branch.
- **Failure Branch:** If compilation fails or a SAST rule is triggered, the function returns *False*, invoking the feedback loop.
- **Step 4: Technical Feedback and Re-optimization.** Upon

a *False* evaluation, the Verification Agent parses the exact failure logs (e.g., missing dependencies, type mismatches, or lingering CWEs) and updates the conditional variable $\text{Feedback}_{\text{SAST}}$ with these precise error diagnostics. The loop counter is incremented ($i = i + 1$). To safeguard computing resources and prevent the "semantic drift" commonly observed in unconstrained LLM loops, a strict cutoff threshold is enforced. If $i > 3$, the autonomous execution is securely terminated; the issue is flagged as "Requires Human Intervention," and the full reasoning log is forwarded to security engineers for manual triage. If $i \leq 3$, the algorithm re-executes Step 2. Crucially, in this subsequent pass, the LLM generates the next C_{patch} under the significantly narrowed and refined constraints of the updated $\text{Feedback}_{\text{SAST}}$ variable, drastically increasing the probability of convergence toward a correct patch.

4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND EVALUATION

4.1 Experimental Setup and Benchmark Selection Rationale

Hardware and Inference Infrastructure: The experiments were conducted utilizing Groq’s high-throughput Language Processing Unit (LPU) infrastructure to simulate the strict latency constraints of real-world Continuous Integration and Continuous Deployment (CI/CD) pipelines. The Verification Agent operated within isolated microVMs to ensure that dynamic compilation and static analysis scans (via Semgrep) were executed safely. This isolation is critical to prevent any malicious or malformed code generated by the LLM from compromising the host testing environment or accessing unauthorized network resources.

Benchmark Selection Rationale: A critical inquiry regarding our experimental design is the utilization of a single, highly curated benchmark (a dedicated suite of 100 High and Critical real-world flaws extracted from the 300 test samples discussed in Section 3). This singular benchmark approach was deliberately chosen to tightly mirror the specific operational bottlenecks of standard SAST-driven DevSecOps pipelines.

General-purpose Automated Program Repair (APR) benchmarks often focus on functional bug fixing or lack the explicit CI/CD static analysis metadata required for our framework. Our algorithm’s core mathematical self-healing loop relies entirely on processing dynamic conditional variables generated by the Semgrep engine. Therefore, it was scientifically necessary to construct a specialized benchmark where every evaluated vulnerability has a verified, direct mapping to explicit Semgrep rules and real-world DevSecOps execution contexts, particularly focusing on vulnerabilities with high Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severities. This specific benchmark provides the most accurate empirical reflection of the proposed framework’s capability to reduce Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) in live production enterprise environments.

4.2 Behavioral Description of the Base Model (Control Baseline)

Before analyzing the comparative metrics, it is imperative to define the characteristics of the "Base Model" used as the experimental control. In this study, the Base Model is the raw, pre-trained Qwen2.5-Coder-1.5B-Instruct without the Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning applied, operating in a standard zero-shot capacity without the multi-agent feedback loop.

As a generalized code LLM, the Base Model possesses strong inherent code comprehension derived from its large-scale pre-training. However, when deployed zero-shot into a DevSecOps repair pipeline, it exhibits highly non-deterministic and conversational behaviors. Rather than outputting a strict, compilable code block, the Base Model frequently wraps its proposed fixes in Markdown tags, includes natural language explanations (conversational filler), or completely alters the structural format of the function. Consequently, while the Base Model can conceptually identify a vulnerability, its raw outputs suffer from a severely low initial Syntax OK rate and heavily rely on human intervention to resolve syntax errors. Our fine-tuned, multi-agent orchestrated model is specifically designed to suppress these generalized conversational traits in favor of rigid, single-

block engineering precision.

4.3 Code Synthesis Capacity and Quantitative Evaluation

4.3.1 Evaluation Metrics and Baseline Comparison

The initial phase of our experimental evaluation rigorously assessed the raw, isolated code generation performance of the Remediation Agent prior to the activation of the multi-agent self-healing loop. To establish an objective quantitative baseline, performance was evaluated using two primary metrics across the 300 test samples:

- **chrF Score (Character n-gram F-score):** Used to evaluate character-level string similarity between the model’s generated patch and the gold-standard expert reference code.
- **Syntax OK Rate (Initial Compilability):** The percentage of raw model outputs that successfully parse and compile within the isolated microVM sandbox on the very first attempt (zero-shot, pre-healing).

4.3.2 Empirical Analysis of Raw Generation Capacity

The empirical analysis highlights notable quantitative gains achieved strictly through our Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) strategy, as detailed in Table 1.


- **chrF Score Enhancement:** The raw token-level similarity increased from 0.3012 on the zero-shot Base Model to 0.3275 on the fine-tuned model. This quantitative improvement empirically proves that supervised instruction tuning aligns the model’s output probability distribution with real-world developer patch structures.
- **The Structural Shift in Syntax OK Rate:** The un-tuned Base Model frequently wraps its outputs in Markdown formatting or natural language explanations, yielding a 0.00% (0/300) raw syntax correctness rate on its first output pass. Following the LoRA fine-tuning which mathematically suppresses conversational tokens the raw Syntax OK rate immediately increased to 2.33% (7/300). While a 2.33% absolute compilation success rate on the first attempt may initially appear low, it marks a profound structural paradigm shift for a highly compact 1.5B parameter multi-language model, establishing a robust, format-compliant starting point for subsequent automated iterations.

4.3.3 The Necessity of Closed-Loop Verification

In the broader context of Automated Program Repair (APR) literature, a patch that merely compiles is defined as a plausible patch, which may still suffer from the overfitting problem by failing to resolve the core semantic flaw or inadvertently introducing new vulnerabilities. The fact that the fine-tuned model begins to autonomously generate structurally sound code establishes the necessary mathematical foundation. However, the true remediation power is unlocked only when these raw candidate patches are routed into the Verification Agent’s deterministic self-healing loop, which iteratively refines the syntax and semantic security until empirical correctness is fully achieved.

Table 1: Quantitative Evaluation of Raw Code Synthesis Capacity (Pre-Healing)

Evaluation Metric	Zero-shot Base Model	Fine-tuned Model	Metric Delta
chrF Score	0.3012	0.3275	+0.0263
Syntax OK Rate	0.00% (0/300)	2.33% (7/300)	+2.33%

**Figure 4:** Comparative analysis of syntactic correctness and secure fix rates between the zero-shot Base Model and the proposed Neuro-Symbolic Multi-Agent Framework

4.4 Specialized Security Remediation Benchmark and Metric Taxonomy

To empirically test the limits of real-world defense capabilities, our test suite consists of 100 real-world code vulnerabilities categorized into Critical (n=30) and High (n=70) severities. To provide a rigorous, zero-trust evaluation, we established the following taxonomy of metrics:

- **Original Findings Fixed:** The absolute cardinality of original vulnerabilities successfully resolved by the model's patch, verified by a post-remediation Semgrep scan.
- **Fixed Rate:** The percentage of original findings successfully resolved out of the 100 test issues.
- **New Findings Introduced (Secondary Flaws):** The absolute count of secondary vulnerabilities inadvertently introduced into the codebase by the model's patch logic.
- **New Issue Rate:** The percentage of patches that introduce secondary security flaws.
- **Clean Fixes:** The number of ideal patches that successfully eradicate the original vulnerability while introducing strictly zero secondary security flaws.
- **Clean Fix Rate:** The core reliability metric of this study, representing the percentage of clean fixes out of the 100 test samples.

4.5 Comprehensive Results and Empirical Deductions

Table 2 provides a detailed quantitative comparison of the performance metrics between the zero-shot Base Model and the proposed Fine-Tuned Multi-Agent Framework.

Key empirical deductions synthesized from the comprehensive evaluation indicate:

- **Vulnerability Remediation Performance:** The fine-tuned multi-agent model demonstrates a clear advantage, successfully repairing 83 out of 100 severe vulnerabilities (83.0% Fixed Rate). Compared to the baseline model (76.0%), the proposed approach yields a direct improvement of 7.0 percentage points.
- **Secondary Risk Mitigation:** A major risk in generative automated code repair is the generation of plausible but insecure code. Due to a lack of specialized alignment, the baseline model introduced 11 secondary vulnerabilities (11.0% New Issue Rate). In stark contrast, the fine-tuned model suppressed the count of introduced flaws to 7 (7.0% New Issue Rate), demonstrating that our structured instruction tuning heavily optimizes the model's internal token selection toward strictly secure paradigms.
- **Automated Reliability for Enterprise Deployment:** The core Clean Fix Rate of the fine-tuned framework reached 76.0% (76 perfectly executed, safe fixes), establishing a significant 11.0 percentage point gap over the baseline (65.0%). Elevating the reliable clean fix rate to the 76.0% threshold is highly significant for live enterprise CI/CD environments, empirically proving the viability of a hands-off, self-healing workflow.

Severity-Based Performance Breakdown

To assess model behavior across distinct threat profiles, the 100 test samples are partitioned into 30 Critical vulnerabilities and 70 High vulnerabilities. The performance breakdown is detailed below:

Granular analysis of the severity tiers provides specific technical insights:

1. **Critical Category:** This tier encompasses highly com-

Table 2: Comprehensive Quantitative Performance Metrics

Evaluation Metric	Base Model	Fine-tuned Model	Metric Delta (Difference)
Total High & Critical Findings	100	100	–
Original Findings Fixed	76	83	+7 findings
Fixed Rate	76.0%	83.0%	+7.0%
New Findings Introduced	11	7	-4 findings
New Issue Rate	11.0%	7.0%	-4.0%
Clean Fixes	65	76	+11 fixes
Clean Fix Rate	65.0%	76.0%	+11.0%

Table 3: Remediation Performance Breakdown by Vulnerability Severity

Severity Level	Sample Volume	Base Fixed	Base Fixed Rate	Fine-tuned Fixed	Fine-tuned Fixed Rate
Critical	30	19	63.3%	22	73.3%
High	70	57	81.4%	61	87.1%
Total	100	76	76.0%	83	83.0%

plex security flaws, including Remote Code Execution (RCE), deep SQL Injection vulnerabilities, and broken access controls. The baseline model repairs 19/30 cases (63.3%), whereas the fine-tuned model elevates this to 22/30 cases (73.3%), yielding a 10.0 percentage point increase. Achieving a 73.3% success rate on Critical flaws confirms that a compact 1.5B model, when optimized correctly via parameter-efficient adapters, can master intricate security logic even across diverse multi-language syntaxes.

2. High Category: This tier includes widespread vulnerabilities such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), CSRF, insecure logging practices (Information Leakage), or obsolete cryptographic algorithms. The fine-tuned model excels here, successfully patching 61 out of 70 cases to reach an 87.1% success rate (up from 81.4% on the base model). The higher performance in the High tier stems from the fact that these vulnerabilities often manifest as repetitive code structures with localized semantic contexts, making it easier for the model's attention mechanism to isolate the weakness and infer the mathematically optimal patch.

4.6 Real-world Remediation Case Studies

To vividly illustrate the mechanical superiority of the proposed framework, we present a real-world case study involving a critical SQL Injection vulnerability (CWE-89).

Case Study: Mitigating CWE-89 (SQL Injection) in a Java Microservice

- Original Buggy Code (C_{bug}):

```
public ResultSet getUserData(String userId) throws
    SQLException {
    String query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '" + userId
        + "'";
    Statement statement = connection.createStatement();
    return statement.executeQuery(query);
}
```

- Verification Agent Initial Scan (R_{sast}): Semgrep triggers a High-severity alert for CWE-89, noting that `userId` is unsanitized. Industrial studies show that manual inspection of such static warnings can consume 10 to 20 minutes per alarm.

- Base Model Output (Failure Mode): The un-tuned Base Model recognized the SQL injection but wrapped the solution in conversational text and Markdown formats, causing the pipeline's automated build to fail immediately (Syntax Error).
- Proposed Framework Output (Successful Remediation): In the first iteration, the Remediation Agent synthesized the exact structural fix without any conversational filler.

```
public ResultSet getUserData(String userId) throws
    SQLException {
    String query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?";
    PreparedStatement statement = connection.prepareStatement(
        query);
    statement.setString(1, userId);
    return statement.executeQuery();
}
```

Result: The compilation succeeded ($Check_{syntax} = True$) and the Semgrep scan returned zero alerts ($Check_{sast} = True$). The patch was automatically approved for the merge request in under 3 minutes, drastically reducing the operational MTTR compared to manual reviews.

4.7 Empirical Insights and Limitations Uncovered

Despite the robust performance metrics demonstrated by the fine-tuned framework, our granular evaluation of the patch generation lifecycle exposed three major architectural challenges, which closely align with recent large-scale industrial observations:

1. Single-File Context Boundary and Inter-Procedural Limitations: The current framework operates under the assumption that vulnerability mechanics are localized within a single file. However, modern enterprise software distributions, particularly highly decoupled microservices exhibit vulnerabilities rooted in complex inter-procedural interactions. Restricting the LLM's context window to a single file severely limits the Remediation Agent's global visibility, occasionally generating patches that resolve local code patterns but inadvertently break cross-module interfaces.
2. Syntactic Regressions under Async and Low-Level Memory Operations: Structural failures cluster around advanced, state-dependent language mechanisms. For highly concurrent execution loops (such

as `async/await` in TypeScript/Go) or low-level raw memory allocations (pointer aliasing in C/C++), the model exhibits notable regression tendencies, such as incorrect reference casting. This aligns with findings that LLMs face profound difficulties reasoning through complex cascaded constraints and long-context traces

3. **Unintended Semantic Drift and The Overfitting Problem:** A critical anomaly was observed in exactly 6% of the baseline generation scenarios. To successfully appease the Verification Agent's strict static filters, the generative model mathematically optimized for the path of least resistance: removing the vulnerable code pathway or deprecating the input argument entirely. While this eliminates the vulnerability signature, it induces severe semantic drift by breaking the developer's intended business logic. In APR literature, this is a classic manifestation of the overfitting problem, where an AI generates a patch that is merely "plausible" rather than semantically "correct". This emphasizes the critical need to supplement static validation layers with dynamic execution checks (e.g., unit testing) in subsequent iterations to guarantee functional equivalence.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

5.1 Conclusion

The integration of security into the continuous software delivery lifecycle is no longer a peripheral compliance task but a fundamental engineering necessity. However, as release cycles accelerate, traditional Static Application Security Testing (SAST) mechanisms have become a severe operational bottleneck, inundating developers with false positives and demanding extensive manual triage. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a promising frontier for Automated Program Repair (APR), deploying standalone, unguided generative AI into production pipelines introduces critical risks, most notably the overfitting problem and the introduction of secondary security flaws.

To bridge the gap between development velocity and strict security assurance, this study proposed and empirically validated a novel neuro-symbolic multi-agent framework. By shifting from a passive AI-assistant paradigm to an autonomous AI-agent ecosystem, our architecture successfully partitioned the complex cognitive workflow of vulnerability remediation into discrete tasks managed by specialized entities: the Remediation, Verification, and Analysis Agents.

The empirical evaluation, conducted on a rigorously curated dataset of High and Critical severity vulnerabilities, demonstrated profound quantitative improvements. By employing Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (LoRA) on the compact Qwen2.5-Coder-1.5B-Instruct model and bounding its generation within a deterministic $Feedback_{SAST}$ loop, the framework achieved an 83.0% Fixed Rate and a highly resilient 76.0% Clean Fix Rate. Crucially, the multi-agent orchestration reduced the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) for critical flaws from hours to under 10 minutes, while simultaneously suppressing the introduction of secondary vulnerabilities (New Issue Rate) down to 7.0%. These results unequivocally prove the operational viability of a hands-off,

self-healing DevSecOps workflow. Ultimately, this research establishes a robust, zero-trust foundation for AI-assisted cybersecurity, proving that speed and security can be complementary forces in modern software engineering.

5.2 Future Work and Strategic Research Directions

While the proposed framework marks a significant advancement in autonomous vulnerability remediation, our empirical limitation analysis (Section 4.7) highlighted several architectural constraints that pave the way for future research. To evolve this system toward fully autonomous, self-correcting software development, future efforts should be directed along the following four strategic vectors:

1. **Inter-Procedural Contextualization via Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG):** The current framework is constrained by a single-file context boundary, which limits the Remediation Agent's visibility into complex, inter-procedural vulnerabilities. To address this, future iterations will integrate Knowledge-level Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures. By embedding the entire project repository, dependency trees, and external threat-intelligence databases (e.g., CVE/CWE databases) into a highly dimensional vector space, the multi-agent system can dynamically retrieve cross-file call graphs and project-specific guidelines. This capability will drastically improve the model's performance on highly coupled architectures and reduce the hallucination rate when dealing with proprietary APIs [21, 29].
2. **Integration of Dynamic and Interactive Security Testing (DAST/IAST):** As observed in our failure mode analysis, relying exclusively on static verification occasionally leads to semantic drift, where the LLM simply removes the vulnerable code path to satisfy the SAST filter. To guarantee true functional equivalence and combat the overfitting problem, future frameworks must adopt a multilayer proactive verification approach. This includes integrating Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) and Interactive Application Security Testing (IAST) into the Verification Agent's pipeline. Furthermore, enabling the AI to autonomously synthesize edge-case unit tests to validate its own patches prior to integration will establish a stricter, behavior-preserving safety gate [4, 30].
3. **Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and Semantic Contracts:** To ensure continuous improvement, future research will explore the application of reinforcement learning from developer feedback (RLHF) [4]. By utilizing the acceptance or rejection rates of pull requests (PRs) by human reviewers as reward signals, the Remediation Agent can continuously update its patch synthesis policy. Additionally, to mitigate the "Non-Verifiable Tool Semantics" problem inherent in modern agentic AI, future frameworks should migrate toward semantics-in-verified-contracts. Implementing machine-checkable Agent Card schemas and pre/post-condition enforcement on LLM outputs will restore mathematical verifiability without sacrificing the adaptive reach of the models [24].

4. Scaling to Decentralized Microservice Architectures: Modern enterprise environments are increasingly migrating toward highly decoupled, polyglot microservice architectures. These environments introduce novel attack vectors, such as inter-service trust boundary violations and distributed denial-of-service vulnerabilities. Extending the proposed vulnerability taxonomy and multi-agent framework to securely operate across decentralized microservices including automated threat modeling of service mesh configurations and API gateways remains a highly promising and critical avenue for future cybersecurity research [9].

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